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The Australian Wheat Board scandal: investigating international bribery 
The past decade has seen a dramatic increase in public awareness of white-collar crime. 
One form of white-collar crime that has spread from national to international levels is 
bribery. However, despite this, international bribery remains an important growth area 
which requires more research (Rollings 2008). The aim of this paper is twofold, aiming 
to: a) provide an in-depth understanding of international bribery by adopting an 
opportunity-focused theoretical framework, namely, the routine activity theory; and b) 
provide information that could enhance the investigation, detection and prevention of 
this crime. Understanding the context in which international bribery occurs is an 
important step in being able to investigate, detect and prevent it. To explore this, a case 
study analysis is conducted on Australia’s largest international bribery case, the 
Australian Wheat Board (AWB) Scandal. Data analysis enabled the construction of a 
chronological timeline of the key events which is analysed against theoretical elements 
drawn from the routine activity theory and relevant literature. This method is found to 
be useful in providing an in-depth understanding of international bribery, from which 
suggestions are made as to how the regulation of this crime may be improved. This 
study contributes valuable information to the international bribery discourse, which 
currently lacks empirical research. It confirms the suitability of opportunity-focused 
theories to explain white-collar crime and highlights a number of areas which have 
implications for future research.  
Keywords: international bribery; Australian Wheat Board; routine activity theory; 
white-collar crime 
 
Introduction 
With the advent of globalisation, diverse cultures are gradually becoming more intertwined as 
businesses adapt to operating in a borderless world (Pedigo and Marshall 2009). 
Consequently, white-collar crimes are now committed within countries, between countries 
and across multiple borders. This expansion has made white-collar crime the single most 
significant impediment to worldwide economic development and growth (Gray and 
Kaufmann 1998). Presently, white-collar crime costs the Australian Government upwards of 3 
$8.5 billion per year; which accounts for around 40% of the total cost of crime (Sanyal and 
Samanta 2011). In America every year, 6% of business revenues are lost to occupational 
white-collar crime and, on a global scale, the World Bank estimates more than $1 trillion in 
bribes are paid out of a $30 trillion world economy (Sanyal and Samanta 2011).  
The most expensive and common form of white-collar crime is bribery (Cleveland et 
al. 2009). It has spread from national to international levels, posing as a particularly menacing 
and unethical problem world-wide. International bribery, also referred to as foreign, 
extraterritorial or transnational bribery, occurs when two citizens from different countries 
participate in an act of bribery. This is particularly an issue when companies from different 
countries, with differing regulatory regimes for bribery, conduct business with one another. 
This often results in the other nations breaching their own country’s law to facilitate the 
business transaction (Williams 2006). The past decade has seen a dramatic increase in public 
awareness of white-collar crime; however, despite this, international bribery remains an area 
requiring more research (Rollings 2008). This study aimed to provide: an in-depth 
understanding of international bribery through the use of routine activity theory, and 
information that could enhance the investigation, detection and prevention of this crime.  
Despite opportunity-focused theories being highlighted as suitable tools in explaining 
white-collar crime no empirical studies have been undertaken into how routine activity theory 
could help in understanding acts of international bribery (Koppen et al. 2010). This study 
seeks to address this gap by exploring how the routine activity theory applies to the Australian 
Wheat Board (AWB) Scandal.  
Review of the literature 
A review of the key literature surrounding white-collar crime, in particular international 
bribery, and the routine activity theory highlights how international bribery has received little 
attention within academic literature. There are numerous gaps which exist, including the 4 
effectiveness of legislation, the prevalence of international bribery in Australia, the 
occurrence of private-to-private sector international bribery and a clear understanding of 
international bribery and how it can be effectively investigated, detected and prevented.  
International bribery  
Simply put, a bribe is a transaction between two people, one person offering money or other 
goods to a second person in order to induce that person to commit an improper act 
(D’Andrade 1985). Under the Queensland Criminal Code (1995, s.259 and s.260), the first 
person who gives or seeks to give a bribe commits a criminal act and the second person who 
seeks to accept or accepts a bribe, also commits a criminal act. In other words, all parties 
involved are at fault. International bribery occurs when individuals, corporations or 
governments from different countries participate in an act of bribery.  
The principal-agent relationship, which is seen to be present during any act of white-
collar crime, can aid in explaining international bribery. A principal-agent relationship exists 
when a principal assigns a task or activity to an agent, who is then responsible for acting in 
the principal’s interest (James 2002). Problems arise with this relationship when an agent has 
a conflict between their personal interest and the interest of their principal, or when the 
principal asks the agent to carry out an illicit act. In essence:  
•  an agent can bribe a principal from another company;  
•  an agent can bribe an agent from another company; 
•  a principal can bribe an agent from another company; but  
•  a principal cannot bribe another principal.  
Legislation often creates ambiguities such as permitting grease payments (to facilitate 
routine governmental action) but not illicit payments, creating confusion and communication 
conflicting ethical standards to the public, subsequently facilitating the existence of bribery 5 
(Reisman 1977). This confusion increases when exploring international bribery as many 
countries adopt a pragmatic attitude towards the difference between bribery and grease 
payments. One explanation for this pragmatism is cultural variability. Cultural variability 
relates to the varying ethical standards held within different countries (Baughn et al. 2010). 
For example, what some cultures deem bribes are common practice in other cultures, and it is 
considered rude to refuse or not partake in them (Onkvisit and Shaw 1991). When the cultural 
norms, values and motives of suppliers and recipients distinctly differ, one side of the 
business transaction must compromise in order to proceed (Baughn et al. 2010). Furthermore, 
as a country’s economic development is linked to its level of corruption; countries with 
advanced economies are more likely to have clearer laws and guidelines surrounding 
corporate management, whereas countries with poorer economies tend to view bribery as a 
means of supplementing low incomes (Baughn et al. 2010). Thus, cultural variability could 
very well contribute to the occurrence of international bribery.  
For companies operating in countries that prohibit bribery, participating in bribery 
means moral degeneration and violation of the law, while non-participation means a loss of 
business (Onkvisit and Shaw 1991). In the international bribery discourse there are two 
competing moral standpoints: one permits bribery and one does not. Overall, it is the 
interpretation of what constitutes an improper payment and/or act which creates turmoil. The 
different cultural norms and values which shape the laws in each country are causal to the 
difficulties which surround the regulation of international bribery. In a sense, everyone bans 
bribery, but not everyone can agree on what constitutes a bribe. For the purposes of this 
study, the cultural norms and values which shape Australian legislation inform what 
constitutes and improper payment and/or act. It is unethical to argue one moral standpoint as 
superior; however, for ease of analysis one standpoint needs to be adopted.  6 
Impacts of international bribery 
While some researchers have attempted to highlight the positive effects of bribery, such as 
avoidance of burdensome regulations (Dong 2011) and more equitable and progressive 
distribution of income (Hunt and Laszlo 2012), an almost universal consensus exists that 
making a payment in return for an illicit service is unethical, immoral and harmful (Cleveland 
et al. 2009). As the economic cost of white-collar crime can only be roughly estimated, 
estimating the more specific cost of international bribery is even more difficult (Braithwaite 
1985). Therefore, rather than providing inaccurate estimates of its cost, other more established 
economic and wide-spread impacts which result from international bribery are discussed.  
International bribery has been found to impede long-term foreign and domestic 
investment and undercut the government’s ability to raise revenue, leading to higher tax rates, 
which in turn reduce the government’s ability to provide public goods (Gray and Kaufmann 
19989). It distorts governmental priorities and technological choices, pushes privatised firms 
underground and out of the formal sector, causes ineffective tax collection and administration 
and, in uncertain economies, raises transaction costs (Baughn et al. 2010, Gray and Kaufmann 
1998). International bribery diverts money from public accounts to private individuals and 
into foreign bank accounts, while increasing the level of uncertainty in conducting business in 
countries with high levels of corruption (Wilder and Ahrens 2001).  
It also undermines efficiency, equity and integrity by shifting the focus of the 
transaction from quality and price to the size of the bribe. In a fair market, competition 
eliminates inefficiency; however, when bribery is prevalent, inefficient players can survive 
over those who offer high quality, cost effective goods and services (Cleveland et al. 2009, 
Wilder and Ahrens 2001). This leads to the slow implementation of low quality government 
policy (Esty and Porter 2005) and diverts funds from the environmental, health and education 7 
sectors to sectors where bribes are more likely to be processed such as construction and 
infrastructure (Mauro 1998, Rauch 1995, Ruzindana 1997).  
If the above issues go unaddressed, with time poverty will be deepened and poorer 
sections of the community will suffer disproportionately as a result of the strain on 
government funds (Wilder and Ahrens 2001). Furthermore, the erosion of government 
legitimacy will deplete the effectiveness and public confidence in aid programs (Hill 2000, 
Wilder and Ahrens 2001). Bribery can also increase the abuse of human rights and undermine 
years of democratic progression (Hill 2000). As it stands, the primary approach to addressing 
any form of white-collar crime is through government policy and legislation (OECD 2012).  
Policy approaches 
There is an increased measure of importance being placed on nongovernment organisations 
(NGOs), such as Transparency International (TI) and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), with respect to addressing international bribery. 
Established in 1961, the OECD provides a forum in which member governments can work 
together to combat economic and social issues, including international bribery and corruption. 
As of 2012, the OECD had 34 signatories who account for 70% of the world’s trade (OECD 
2012). In 2009, the OECD recommended that all signatories implement legislation which 
prohibits the offer, promise or supply of a bribe to a foreign public official. This led to 39 
countries agreeing to implement such legislation.  
Australia ratified the United Nations’ (UN) Convention against Corruption 2000 and 
the UN’s Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2003. These two treaties and the 
rules of the OECD are the central instruments which address international bribery and 
Australia’s domestic laws meet all of their obligations (AGDCP 2011). The OECD required 
the Australian Government to implement an amendment to the Commonwealth Criminal 8 
Code Act of 1995. This occurred in 1999 and was Australia’s first significant step towards 
confronting international bribery (Hill 2000).  
While the OECD’s effectiveness in combating corruption has been praised (Wilder 
and Ahrens 2001) foreign public official legislation has been criticised. It was argued the 
legislation would only partly address the issue of corruption and criticism arose with 
reference to the Act not addressing issues, such as the difference between necessary gifts or 
facilitation payments, after the fact (Wilder and Ahrens 2001). Many of the provisions within 
the legislation are broad. Therefore, the effectiveness of the legislation in Australia will 
ultimately be determined by Australian courts in their interpretation of the legislation (Wilder 
and Ahrens 2001).  Overall, however, the legislation is believed to be an effective deterrent in 
the sense that it acknowledges international bribery and publicises the regulation and 
criminalisation of such acts (Wilder and Ahrens 2001).  
TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which ranks countries according to their 
perceived levels of public sector corruption, depicted a favourable view of Australia, ranking 
it eighth out of 183 countries surveyed (TI 2011) scoring 8.8 on the 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 
(very clean) scale. However, despite Australia and its regional neighbours Singapore and New 
Zealand being ranked in the top ten countries in the CPI, the vast majority of the remaining 
countries scored below five and16 countries in the same Asia-pacific region ranked below 
three.  
While the does not address participation by private sector employees with public 
sector employees overseas, which is the focus of this paper, given Australia conducts a 
majority of its international business transactions within the Asia-pacific region the CPI 
indicates a concerning reality: Australian employees conducting business abroad are doing so 
in corrupt business environments (Pedigo and Marshall 2009). Criminological theory can be 9 
used to delineate what may be contributing to international bribery in the Australian business 
sector.  
Routine activity theory 
Routine activity theory is an opportunity-based theory that has been shown to be effective in 
aiding the detection and investigation of crime (Culp and Bracco 2005, Marquart et al. 2000, 
Sasse 2005). It claims that a crime cannot take place without the convergence of three core 
elements in time and space: a motivated offender, the presence of a suitable target and the 
absence of a capable guardian (Felson and Cohen 1979). The motivated offender is anybody 
who for any reason may commit a crime, and the suitable target is the item, content or person 
the motivated offender is pursuing (Clarke and Felson 2004). The capable guardian refers to 
any person, body of persons or objects that prevent the crime from occurring (Yar 2005). The 
capable guardian differs from the offender and target because it is the absence of the guardian 
that counts (Felson 2003). Through this approach, Felson and Cohen argue that society invites 
crime to occur by offering a variety of illegal opportunities through the community’s flow of 
routine activities (Natarajan 2011).  
More recently, Felson (1987) increased the three core elements to six (Tillyer and Eck 
2010), adding: intimate handler, a person with whom the motivated offender holds a social 
bond, who can assist in keeping them in order through social control (Felson 1987); place 
manager, a person who is allocated the responsibility of supervising behaviour in their place 
of employment; and crime facilitators, the tools which aid the criminal act (Natarajan 2011).  
A review of the literature highlighted how routine activity theory has created an 
improved understanding of a variety of crimes and how it is a suitable tool for exploring 
white-collar crime (Culp and Bracco 2005, Koppen et al. 2010, Marquart et al. 2000, Sasse 
2005). Therefore, this theory is used to further conceptualise and understand the mechanics of 10 
international bribery offences and highlight how the investigation, detection and prevention of 
this crime may be improved.  
Methodology 
The methodology used for this study involved a qualitative case study analysis of the 
Australian Wheat Board (AWB) Scandal. In particular, an analysis was conducted of the 
events leading up to the scandal beginning in 1990, during the scandal from 1999 to 2005 and, 
the events following until December 2006.   
The research design required the creation of a chronological timeline of key events 
drawn from the data. The grounded theory approach was employed to ensure the data analysis 
was thorough. First, a non-probability judgement sampling strategy was employed to collect a 
sample of publicly available secondary data. Second, the three stages of grounded theory, 
namely, open coding, axial coding and selective coding, were employed to commence the 
data analysis.  
In the open coding stage a list of all dated events was recorded to create a 
chronological timeline. In the axial coding stage, events that were not applicable to the 
international bribery which occurred during the case were removed and the list of four 
theoretical elements from the routine activity theory and literature was devised. In the 
selective coding stage an initial analysis and a sub-analysis was conducted. The initial 
analysis involved the four theoretical elements being analysed against the key events in the 
timeline. The sub-analysis was devised due to a large number of events that remained 
unallocated to theoretical elements following the initial analysis. It involved the three 
additional elements from the routine activity theory being analysed in the same fashion 
against the remaining unallocated events. During these processes, the deviant case analysis 
procedure, theoretical sampling and constant comparative method were employed to improve 11 
the transferability and confirmability of the study. Third, the total number of events alongside 
the total number of each theoretical element was calculated.  
Case selection and background 
The case selected for this methodology was the AWB Scandal (1999–2005). Initially this case 
was selected due to its significance as ‘Australia’s largest reported international bribery case’ 
(Overington 2007). The AWB Scandal’s suitability for this study was further supported after 
conducting detailed research into the case. AWB transitioned from being a publicly-run 
company into a private entity, and therefore provides for an analysis which discusses the 
potential for corruption in both structures. The case was heavily reported in the news media, 
two books on the issue had been published and government and independent inquiries were 
held providing an array of data.  
During this study’s analysis of principal-agent involvement, individuals were assumed 
to be representing the company or organisation they were employed by as opposed to being 
agents in their own right. More specifically, individual principals and agents were not 
identified, instead, they were referred to primarily as the companies, governments or 
organisations they were employed by, unless specifically stated.  
Inquiries and investigations (specifically the Cole Inquiry) into the AWB Sandal 
began in 2003 following years of allegations of misconduct by wheat companies around the 
world, the media and the United States (US) Government. These investigations revealed that 
Saddam Hussein manipulated the restrictions placed on Iraq through the Oil-For-Food-
Program (OFFP), which permitted Iraq to export a restricted quantity of oil and in return 
import specific humanitarian goods. These manipulations involved: Hussein selling oil to 
neighbouring countries without processing the sales through the UN-monitored Banque 
Nationale de Paris (BNP) escrow account (Katzman and Blanchard 2005), allowing the 
money to go directly to the Iraqi Government; and exploiting loopholes in the program’s 12 
regulations — Iraq imposed surcharges on 139 companies who were purchasing OFFP-
approved oil shipments and solicited kickbacks from 2,253 humanitarian goods suppliers, 
including the AWB. (Katzman and Blanchard 2005, Volcker et al. 2005). The kickbacks 
provided Iraq with its largest source of illicit income during the OFFP, totalling more than 
$1.5 billion over a 5-year period (Volcker et al. 2005).  
AWB was the largest provider of humanitarian goods to Iraq under the OFFP which 
ran from December 1996 to 2003. During this time, AWB received a total of $2.3 billion from 
the BNP account by selling 6.8 million tonnes of wheat to Iraq. In return, AWB paid $221.7 
million in illicit fees to Iraq, contributing to 14% of the kickbacks paid during the OFFP 
(Volcker et al. 2005). From 1997 to mid-1999 the Iraqi Grain Board (IGB) was responsible 
for the inland transportation of AWB’s humanitarian supplies. However, directly following 
the privatisation of AWB in July 1999, IGB and AWB agreed to amend the standard contract 
they used for all purchases. This amendment involved the addition of a clause, whereby AWB 
would pay for the inland transportation of the wheat following its delivery to the Iraqi ports 
(Volcker et al. 2005). AWB did not have its own trucking fleet in Iraq and foreign companies 
could not easily access transportation facilities (Meyer and Califano 2006). Instead, AWB 
followed IGB’s instruction and used Alia, a Jordanian transportation company who agreed to 
service AWB’s requirements (Volcker et al. 2005).  
The agreed price of the inland transportation fee (trucking fee), started at $12 per 
tonne of wheat and stayed at this price until mid-2000 when it increased to $15 per tonne. 
From 2001 the fee was between $45–56 per tonne.  This sharp increase coincided with a 
memoranda issued by Iraqi officials demanding a 10% after-service-sales fee (ASSF) to be 
included in the transfer of the trucking fee (Volcker et al. 2005). The trucking fee paid by 
AWB was consistently $25 per tonne and the ASSF averaged around $20–31 per tonne.   13 
In reality Alia was partly owned by the Iraqi Minister of Transportation, who acted as 
a collection agent for the Iraqi Government (Volcker et al. 2005). Under the OFFP no 
supplier was able to directly pay the Iraqi Government with all monetary exchanges having to 
go through the BNP escrow account. However, AWB did not arrange the payments to Alia to 
go through the BNP escrow account, consequently providing money directly to the Iraqi 
Government (see Figure 1). Moreover, the transportation of the wheat from Iraq’s deep water 
port, Umm Qasr, was being managed by Iraqi Government employees (Overington 2007); a 
third-party transportation company was not being used. 
 
[insert Figure 1 near here] 
 
The Iraqi Government made clear that if AWB did not pay the trucking fee the wheat 
would not be accepted on arrival at Umm Qasr (Overington 2007). The first shipment 
following the addition of the trucking was made by an AWB ship. As it was approaching 
Umm Qasr the trucking fee totalling $504,000, which was meant to have been paid five days 
before arrival, had not been paid. Consequently, Iraq advised AWB that if the money was not 
immediately transferred to Alia the ship would be sent back to sea (Overington 2007), 
illustrating Iraq’s unwillingness to do business without payment of the illicit fee and AWB’s 
original hesitance in paying it. It also demonstrates how these kickbacks were, in essence, 
bribes.  
In the AWB Scandal the Iraqi Government filled the role of offering the bribe, by 
granting AWB the large wheat contracts on the premise they would pay the trucking fee and 
ASSF to Alia. AWB filled the role of committing the improper act by breaching the OFFP 
sanctions and paying the illicit fees to the Iraqi Government, via Alia.  14 
Findings 
To interpret the findings of the qualitative analysis this study first questioned if the routine 
activity theory is able to help in understanding the occurrence of international bribery-related 
offences. For a criminal act to occur the routine activity theory predicts the convergence in 
time and space of a motivated offence, a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian 
(Felson 2003, Yar 2005). The initial analysis considered these three key elements as well as 
cultural variability (drawn from the literature as a key ethical issue) against the key events in 
the AWB Scandal. In the sub-analysis Felson’s (2003) three additional elements, intimate 
handler, place manager and crime facilitator, were also considered against the events that 
remained unallocated following the initial analysis. Figure 2 displays the overall findings 
from the coding and analysis of the data. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 near here] 
 
Motivated offender and suitable target 
Due to routine activity theory’s conventional use in explaining predatory violent crime there 
is usually one motivated offender, which is distinct from the one suitable target. However, 
this must be adapted when applied to bribery, as in an act of bribery all parties involved in the 
facilitation of the illicit transaction must be held responsible (D’Andrade 1985). Therefore 
those who seek, offer, accept and pay bribes are offenders, and those who comply in 
accepting bribes are suitable targets. Given the complex nature of international bribery and 
the large number of personnel involved in the AWB Scandal, numerous motivated offenders 
and suitable targets were identified, some of which were classified as both.  
Motivated offender/s were identified within the chronological timeline by looking for 
evidence of anybody who participated in improper decision-making, decisions based on 15 
personal gain and events which facilitated illicit payments. Of the 95 events in the timeline 18 
were allocated to this element and three motivated offenders were identified: the Iraq 
Government, AWB and Alia. When identifying suitable targets evidence was sought of any 
item, content or person that participated in: providing an illicit service, providing a benefit 
outside of its intended purpose and acting as a compliant bribee. The following incidences 
from the AWB Scandal aligned with these criteria: requests for tender by IGB including illicit 
fees, contracts between IGB and AWB including illicit fees, requests for additional fees 
outside of the OFFP and AWB complying to pay the illicit fees. Fourteen of the 95 events 
identified were allocated to this element.  
Based on this analysis, it is evident that AWB committed the improper act of paying 
illicit fees, thus making the company a motivated offender. At the same time, AWB signed 
and paid the contracts inclusive of the illicit fees, thus making the company a suitable target. 
This confirms the roles of motivated offender and suitable target are not exclusive.  
Absence of a capable guardian 
Evidence of system failures, management being absent or not proactive and decisions being 
made without proper justification or investigation was considered when identifying the 
absence of such guardians. Of the 95 events identified 25 were allocated to this element, 
making absence of a capable guardian the largest of the three routine activity theory elements 
evident in the AWB Scandal. The key finding was that the system did not lack guardianship 
because the guardians were not physically absent, it lacked guardianship because said 
guardians were not capable. In other words, it was the incapability of such guardians in 
fulfilling their role responsibility that effectively caused their absence.  
For a guardian to be considered capable they must prevent the crime from occurring 
(Felson 2003). All of the guardians identified in the timeline had the authority to act in a 
capable manner but neglected to do so. In addition to this, there were personnel during the 16 
scandal who tried to act in a capable manner. As seen in Figure 2, the largest category of 
events were those that remained unallocated following the second round of analysis (n=32). 
Employing the deviant case analysis procedure prompted the question: why did these events 
not fit into a theoretical element (Marvasti 2004)? It was found that 56% of these unallocated 
events were incidents of official personnel trying to investigate and reveal the truth behind the 
kickback allegations (n=18). It is believed this group of unallocated events displays a 
systematic communication failure. On numerous occasions the kickback allegations were 
investigated but these investigations failed due to poor communication between departments, 
organisations and businesses.  
Intimate handler, place manager, crime facilitator 
A sub-analysis of intimate handler, place manager and crime facilitator was conducted, 
primarily due to the large amount of unallocated events which remained following the first 
stage of the analysis (n=41). As shown in Figure 2, all three elements were present during the 
AWB Scandal; however, these elements were found to be of a non-significant nature (n=9) 
and their relationship with the events they were allocated to did not produce any new or 
significant knowledge.  
Convergence in Time and Space 
While all three core routine activity theory elements were present during the AWB Scandal, 
to complete Cohen and Felson’s crime chemistry these three elements must have converged in 
time and space (Felson 2003). Theoretically, this convergence is the criminal act taking place. 
The motivated offender, suitable target and absence of a capable guardian were identified in 
the same event on two occasions out of the 95 events in the timeline.  
The convergence of the three elements in the identified events contributed towards to 
the illicit transactions; however, they did not single-handedly depict the criminal act of 17 
international bribery. In fact, the convergence of all three elements in time and space perhaps 
occurred by chance, because regardless of these two events the criminal act would still have 
taken place. This illustrates that the convergence in time and space of a motivated offender, 
suitable target and absence of a capable guardian is not required for international bribery to 
take place. Instead, numerous events contributed to the criminal act; therefore, it is the 
convergence of all three elements during the whole timeline of the AWB Scandal that 
depicted the criminal act. 
What caused the illicit payments? 
Understanding what factors contributed to the bribery is important in identifying how to 
enhance the investigation, detection and prevention this crime. Secondary analysis of the data 
was conducted to identify if it included particular information that explains what caused 
AWB to participate in the corrupt dealings with Iraq. This enables a presentation of further 
facts drawn from the data, including the analysis of cultural variability.  
Cultural variability 
Evidence of varying ethical standards evident in differing countries and any difference in 
cultural norms, values or motives was sought when identifying this element. It was 
hypothesised the analysis of this element would reveal if the cultural differences present 
during the AWB Scandal affected the payment of bribes; 12 of the 95 events in the timeline 
were allocated to this element, including:  
•  AWB and IGB failing to resolve business matters during the many trips made by 
AWB employees to Baghdad; 
•  AWB and IGB holding different views towards in the expected processes and 
responsibilities of each company when conducting business;  18 
•  Iraq believing that AWB would hold the same view as the Australian Government 
in supporting the US and consequently halving all of AWB’s contracts with IGB; 
and  
•  Alia communicating to AWB during investigations that ‘such fees are normal in 
the middle east’ (Volcker et al. 2005, 251).  
The key findings drawn from this analysis are that difficulties occur in relation to 
communication and allocation of responsibility when conducting international business. 
Ordinary business processes differ between companies in different countries and this can lead 
to misunderstandings and disputes. Political disagreement can lead to a loss of business, and 
most importantly, conflicting cultural norms can contribute to international bribery. Alia’s 
message to the Independent Inquiry Commission was a clear indication that bribes were an 
established part of the Middle-Eastern business culture (Volcker et al. 2005). 
Setting 
Felson (2003) applies the routine activity theory to a variety of criminal acts in a number of 
different settings, consistently emphasising the setting can act as a crime generator because 
opportunity is the central cause of crime. Therefore, in considering what caused the payment 
of the kickbacks, the settings in which the illicit transactions occurred were analysed. 
Following allegations of corruption, in August 2000 AWB sought independent assistance 
from Arthur Andersen to determine if any control systems in place were failing and if any 
unethical or illegal behaviour existed within the company, particularly in relation to 
international business transactions conducted by the international marketing group (Cole 
2006). In December 2000, while the illicit payments were occurring, Arthur Andersen 
reported their findings, highlighting areas for improvement and key recommendations, to 
AWB.  19 
Overall, the review found a number of clear warning signs presented to AWB 
employees in relation to the payments to Alia, which they failed to fully explore in a legal or 
commercial manner (Cole 2006). These included: the AWB culture, particularly with regard 
to ethicality and management pressure to achieve sales; the potentially reputation-damaging 
acts of seeking to disguise or hide trucking fee payments; and the concern surrounding 
excessive increases in trucking fees, which ‘may be diverted for purposes other than trucking’ 
(Cole 2006).  
Arthur Andersen recommended that AWB: conduct an ethical assessment of the 
culture within the organisation; create a transparent environment where employees are 
encouraged to report incidents, risks and improper conduct; construct controls that will 
prevent and deter illegal and improper conduct; and educate staff in relation to risk, controls 
and the expectations of AWB (Arthur Andersen 2000; Cole 2006). 
Following the review, Charles Stott (AWB’s International Sales and Marketing 
Manager) was allocated the task of implementing the recommendations. He made his own 
investigations and reported to AWB management that Alia was legitimate and the UN had 
approved the increase in the trucking fees. The Cole Inquiry found both of these statements to 
be false and, that following the Arthur Andersen report, AWB made no inquiry into its 
culture, why AWB thought it necessary to disguise the payments to Alia, the reason for the 
increase in trucking fees, or why AWB had agreed to pay the fees (Cole 2006).  
The single desk and sole distribution 
During the scandal AWB was the exclusive manager and marketer of all Australian wheat 
exports through a supply pooling system arrangement with Australian wheat growers, 
commonly referred to as a single desk policy (Bartos 2006, Volcker et al. 2005). Single desk 
policies are controversial as they place once body in charge of numerous other independent 
bodies. Essentially, AWB controlled the entire sale of one of Australia’s largest export 20 
industries placing AWB in a position of great power and responsibility (Staley 2008). It could 
be argued the single desk arrangement contributed to the illicit payments as it was this policy 
that gave AWB access to the amount of wheat and funds required to service Iraq’s large 
wheat contracts.  
Rationalisations 
Various rationalisations made by absent capable guardians and individuals involved in the 
AWB Scandal emerged from the data analysis. One rationalisation that emerged from the 
Cole Inquiry was a strong denial of knowledge and responsibility put forth by various 
guardians. One such denial was made by Australia’s Minister for Trade at the time, Mark 
Vaile, when he said: ‘I have no recollection that any employee or agent of AWB ever 
discussed with me the detailed nature of the AWB’s arrangements to deliver wheat to Iraq’ 
(Cole 2006, 95). He said this despite having been carbon copied in on a number of 
correspondences regarding the kickback allegations. Consequently, the Cole Inquiry had no 
other choice but to find these individuals had no contributing role in the AWB Scandal (Cole 
2006). It is feared these denials were used as a mechanism to shift the blame, reflect 
responsibility and adopt the ‘not my job role’ approach to detecting the illicit payments. 
These types of post hoc rationalisations contribute to the spread of corruption through a lack 
of accountability and a failure to identify what went wrong (Rabl and Kuhlmann 2009).  
In addition to these denials, it was found that the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (DFAT) failed to read and act on intelligence reports outlining Iraq’s manipulation of 
the OFFP with the use of Alia. The department’s inability to take action on substantial 
evidence of corruption was reportedly due to the intelligence being ‘not of sufficient 
importance to be a subject of specific importance’ (Cole 2006, 101). In other words, the 
system in place (guardian) failed to detect the $221.7 million paid in bribes because the level 21 
of substantiation required was higher than documentation gathered by Australian intelligence 
agencies.  
These types of justifications promote poor communication, a lack of individual role 
responsibility and unreasonable substantiation requirements within the business setting.  
Investigation, Detection and Prevention 
This case study found that various business arrangements and systematic flaws contributed to 
the illicit payments that occurred during the AWB Scandal. This section discusses how these 
findings can be used, through incorporating the literature on white-collar crime and 
international bribery, to improve the investigation, detection and prevention of international 
bribery. 
Level of responsibility 
During an international bribery investigation it is the responsibility of the investigator to 
prepare a report providing all of the facts and evidence pertaining to the case to ensure a 
conviction in court (Williams 2006). Investigators may find it helpful to use the routine 
activity theory during their case analysis and report writing process. A key element of any 
white-collar crime is establishing the offender intended to commit the crime; that is, proving 
intent (Williams 2006). Routine activity theory can be used to identify the overt act that 
occurred during the case, from which intent can be inferred (Azuelos-Atias 2006). In addition, 
the theory will enable investigators to: clarify the actions taken by each party by categorising 
them into the three key elements based on the measurement principles; allocate a level of 
responsibility (i.e. is a motivated offender, who has also acted as a suitable target, more or 
less responsible for the illicit acts than an individual who has only acted as a motivated 
offender); and justify this level of responsibility based on the individual actions of the persons 
involved. This will improve the credibility of the investigator’s report and help to secure a 22 
conviction in court.  
Raising awareness, whistle-blowing and communication 
In this case study absence of a capable guardian was the most frequently identified element of 
the routine activity theory (n=25). Two key reasons identified as contributing to this were the 
denial of knowledge and responsibility by the guardians and poor systematic communication. 
By analysing the unallocated events, the systematic communication failure was further 
supported (n=32). Of the unallocated events 56% were found to be events whereby a guardian 
was neither capable nor incapable. That is, their actions were appropriate as they tried to 
reveal the truth behind the corruption allegations; however, the system failed to effectively 
support their inquiries. 
The denials of knowledge and responsibility indicate the guardians lacked 
understanding or concern toward the negative effects of international bribery and perhaps 
feared retribution of making unsubstantiated claims or revealing a corrupt culture.  Based on 
these findings, two methods are suggested to combat this issue. First, employees, particularly 
those involved in public works, contracts and construction, who are seen to be most-likely to 
participate in bribery abroad, need to be educated and informed of the negative effects and 
consequences of white-collar crime (Hardoon and Heinrich 2011). By creating a more 
informed workplace, not only will employees be aware of how to detect white-collar crime 
they will also be aware of why they should not participate in white-collar crime. To target a 
wider audience advertising campaigns that communicate a number of key messages that help 
in understanding white-collar crime are recommended. In effect this could decrease the 
number of individuals in the community who rationalise this type of crime as acceptable, 
which may potentially decrease the number of individuals who choose to participate in white-
collar crime and potentially increase the number of whistle-blowers. 23 
The second method relates to effective whistle-blowing processes being available to 
employees that deal with foreign trade. A finding which further supports the importance of 
effective whistle-blowing procedures was the finding that lots of smaller events contributed to 
the AWB illicit payments, as opposed to a more conventional crime where the criminal act 
occurs in one location during one timeframe. Therefore, anonymous whistle-blowing is an 
effective system which must, at the very least, be available to all individuals involved in 
foreign business trading to facilitate the detection of international bribery. This could be 
facilitated by an independent anonymous investigative agency, which in time could develop 
into an international network of anonymous agencies that investigate whistle-blowing, who 
work alongside intelligence agencies to combat international white-collar crime.  
The poor systematic communication that occurred throughout the AWB Scandal 
indicated that communication between the multitude of government bodies, agencies, 
organisations and companies involved in foreign trading may be unreliable when it comes to 
detecting and preventing international bribery. This issue is a reflection of the existence of a 
myth system and an operational code in place in numerous organisations at the time of the 
AWB Scandal (Reisman 1977). More specifically, the myth system in place stated that 
everybody acted on their received correspondence and the operational code in place; that is, 
what actually occurred was selective reading. Individuals did not take ownership over 
communications addressed to numerous persons or themselves, and corporate management 
did not enforce them to do so. Based on this finding it is suggested that governments and 
privatised businesses place added emphasis on individual role responsibility amongst 
employees. Every piece of communication received by each employee should be followed up 
and if this is not possible, each organisation needs to review their methods of communication. 
Every organisation should clarify the responsibilities of the individual the correspondence is 24 
directly addressed to, this clarification is essential for the abolishment of myth systems and 
operational codes.  
Business practice 
During the scandal Arthur Andersen’s review highlighted a number of issues with AWB’s 
business practices. This demonstrates the importance of all businesses to have procedural 
reviews in place which address business integrity, corporate culture and accounts. 
Furthermore, it emphasises the importance of following up and implementing, where possible, 
key advice resulting from reviews. Companies need to implement comprehensive compliance 
programs and effective financial internal controls, such as procedural reviews. By doing so 
they can substantially abate their risk of violating international bribery legislation and ensure 
high ethical standards are maintained.    
Market regulation 
This study found that the Australian wheat industry’s single-desk policy may have contributed 
to the AWB Scandal. This policy effectively reduced the number of guardians in place to 
supervise the business practiced within the Australian wheat trade and allocated all of the 
decision-making power to one body: AWB. Therefore, to reduce the likelihood of corruption, 
all single-desk policy-run industries should employ a greater number of capable guardians. 
This can mean the implementation of policies, strategies and review processes, as outlined 
above, or more individuals in supervisory roles—as long as they act as preventatives in 
stopping corruption.   
The restrictive trade practiced by Iraq and AWB (that is, AWB gaining sole distributor 
rights over the Iraqi wheat trade) was also highlighted as contributory to the length of the 
scandal. The sole distributor rights effectively eliminated competition in the marketplace for 
AWB, which decreased the likelihood of the kickbacks being detected and victimised the 25 
people of Iraq as the country’s money was not necessarily being spent in their best interests. 
This study does not disagree with the granting of sole distributor rights; however, it does not 
agree these rights being granted on the proviso of an illicit arrangement as was the case in the 
AWB Scandal. In this situation this right becomes a crime facilitator.  
To decrease the likelihood of this occurring, this study emphasises the need for 
industry regulators to encourage market competition, especially in the international business 
sphere (OECD 2010). In addition, it reinstates the need for sole distributor rights to be granted 
in a legal and ethical manner.  
International regulation 
This study found that difficulties occur when communicating and allocating responsibility 
when conducting international business. Ordinary business processes differ between 
companies in different countries and this can lead to misunderstandings and disputes. Political 
disagreement can lead to a loss of business and, most importantly, conflicting cultural norms 
can contribute to white-collar crime. 
These findings suggest that to prevent international bribery, the cultural norms and 
values common within those countries conducting large levels of international business need 
to be ascertained and documented. This information could be used to determine when 
countries with conflicting cultural norms are conducting business. This knowledge will enable 
countries that prohibit international bribery to improve their regulation of the contracts and 
transactions that occur with countries that do not.  
Conclusion 
There has been a growing body of literature exploring transnational white-collar crime and 
opportunity-focused criminological theories. However, despite literature highlighting the 
suitability of opportunity theory’s in explaining white-collar crime, very few empirical studies 26 
have been undertaken that combine these two fields (Culp and Bracco 2005, Koppen et al. 
2010, Marquart et al. 2000, Sasse 2005). This research partly addressed this gap by exploring 
if a criminological opportunity theory, namely the routine activity theory, was able to help 
explain an act of international bribery.  
The analysis found that motivated offenders, suitable targets and the absence of a 
number of capable guardians were all present during the AWB Scandal and these roles were 
filled by more than one item, content or person. It was found these roles were not exclusive—
a person could be a motivated offender and a suitable target. In addition, the AWB Scandal 
did not occur in a setting which lacked physical guardianship – numerous guardians were 
identified — instead it was a lack of capability that caused their absence. Lastly, the 
convergence of all three elements in time and space, in relation to international bribery, must 
be adapted. When the three elements did converge it was by chance and did not depict the 
criminal act. All three elements of the theory were presented during the AWB Scandal; 
however, their convergence occurred during the whole timeline of the scandal and not in a 
particular time and space.  
These findings confirm that the routine activity theory framework is able to help in 
understanding international bribery related offences. The diverse and complex nature of 
international bribery was highlighted by outlining the responsibility of all persons involved, 
the important difference between tangible and capable guardianship, and the ability for crime 
to arise from lots of small events as opposed to one criminal act. However, despite this 
improved understanding, this analysis failed to explain what caused the payment of the bribes.  
The second research focus was to determine what can be done to improve the 
investigation, detection and prevention of international bribery. It was found that the 
investigation of international bribery cases could be improved by investigators utilising the 
routine activity theory. Understanding the roles motivated offender, suitable target and absent 27 
capable guardian would allow them to determine the level of responsibility each party is 
subject to and provide this information in their investigative report to help secure a conviction 
in court. Investigators are also able to use the theory to identify the overarching act that 
occurred from which the intent of the offender can be inferred.  
This paper concludes that the detection of international bribery can be improved by 
establishing independent anonymous agencies to investigate whistle-blowing and by 
advertising campaigns raising awareness of the negative consequences of the crime. The 
prevention of international bribery will be aided by educating and informing the individuals 
who play guardian roles of the negative consequences of international bribery. Governments 
and private businesses need to emphasise individual role responsibility, and businesses need 
to conduct and follow up on procedural reviews which address their integrity, corporate 
culture and accounts. Industry regulators need to encourage market competition and any sole 
distributor rights need to be granted in a legal and ethical manner. Lastly, the cultural norms 
and values common within countries need to be identified to enable the monitoring and 
regulation of cultural variability during international business transactions.  
Limitations 
While this study has presented valuable information to the international bribery discourse 
there are some limitations. As there is no previous empirical research on international bribery 
with an opportunity-based theoretical application, no comparisons or similarities are 
available. This decreases the generalisability of the findings as they are based on a single case 
study design. However, analytical techniques were employed throughout the data analysis to 
increase the generalisability of this case study (Flyvbjerg 2006, Platt 1992). These techniques 
ensured the findings are highly credible and transferable. Therefore, they are able to act as a 
basis for future research to draw analytical generalisation and a basis for law enforcement to 
work from within the context of this methodology.  28 
Future research 
This study identified three key findings which have implications for future research. First, the 
perceived likelihood of private firms paying bribes to other private firms is almost as high as 
the bribery of foreign public officials (Hardoon and Heinrich 2011). This paper focused on a 
case involving a privatised Australian company and an overseas government body. A 
comparative study which explores the differences between private-to-private sector 
international bribery could provide new information, particularly surrounding the 
effectiveness of the different regulatory processes within the public and private sectors. 
Second, the three additional elements of the routine activity theory, namely intimate 
handler, place manager and crime facilitator, were found to exist in the AWB Scandal. Future 
research could conduct an in-depth exploration of these elements, potentially providing 
further improvements to the regulation of international bribery and act as a comparison to the 
results of this study.  
Third, this study focused solely on crime opportunity theory and did not explore 
individual motivation. Accordingly, individuals were assumed to represent the company that 
employed them. In the initial coding stages, however, individual involvement was outlined in 
the chronological timeline. Therefore, future research could use this data set to analyse 
individual involvement and motivation and compare these findings to the opportunity analysis 
provided within this study. This could provide a major contribution to criminological 
research, which has debated over the varying significance of opportunity and criminality for 
decades (Natarajan 2011).  
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Figure 1. AWB Scandal (Volcker et al. 2005) 
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Figure 2. Number of events per theoretical element 
 
 